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THE SUPREME COURT A CO-ORDINATE
BRANCH OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT
The annual meeting of the American Bar Association was held
at Washington in October last to commemorate the one hundred
and twenty-fifth anniversary of the organization of the Supreme
Court of the United States. Addresses were delivered by Presi-
dent Wilson and ex-President Taft. So much attention has
been recently directed to the position of this Court in our system
of government, and the charge has been so boldly made that the
authority claimed by the Court to declare acts of Congress or of
the State legislatures to be in violation of the Constitution of
the United States and therefore void, is a usurpation, that it is
opportune to call attention to American history. -
However widely the disputants differ, they all substantially
agree on one point, that the government of the United States
was a new system and differed in many important particulars
from any of the confederations that had preceded it. It was
formed by a convention in which each of the thirteen colonies
was represented. Each of these colonies declared its adhesion
to the new constitution and the government formed thereby went
into operation in the year 1789. But even during the adminis-
tration of Washington disputes arose as to the extent of the
powers conferred by the constitution upon various departments'
of the government. The tenth amendment, adopted during that
administration, declared positively what the advocates of the
constitution had maintained during the preliminary debates, that
"the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States
respectively or to the People." But in case of a dispute, who
should decide as to the extent of these powers? That was a
vital question. On this point three theories were held, which
until the last decade may fairly be said to exhaust the category.
The first was that each State must decide for itself. The sec-
ond that each department of the Government should decide for
itself. The third was that the Supreme Court was the final arbi-
ter and that all questions involving the construction and effect
to be given to the constitution of the United States must finally
be decided by that tribunal.
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Of the first of these theories John C. Calhoun was the ablest
and most brilliant advocate. He maintained that the United
States were a confederation of States, each sovereign. In all
cases of a confederation or league, he said, there being no com-
mon arbiter superior to the component members, each member
must judge for itself of its own rights under the terms of the
league, of the infraction of those rights, and of the mode and
measure of redress. Each State, therefore, must decide for
itself as to its rights, and punish their violation. The second
premise of this argument must be admitted; but the first we
deny. Our fathers established in 1789 a united government,-
not a confederation.
The colonies were at first independent one of another. They
declared war upon their Indian neighbors and made peace with
them, issued Colonial currency, and, now and then, when danger
made it necessary, entered into treaties with each other, which
bound each member to furnish so many men and so much money
for the common defense. When the danger ceased, they
separated. Alarmed by the Stamp Act, each colony, acting
through its Assembly, sent delegates to a Congress. Each dele-
gation represented its own State, and each State voted as a unit.
They drafted addresses and made recommendations to the sev-
eral States, but here their power ended. When the news came
from Lexington and Bunker Hill, by independent colonial action
troops went to Boston, to New York, to Philadelphia-State, not
Continental troops. Dissensions broke out, and the necessity of
some bond of union became apparent. Congress proposed to the
States articles of confederation, which, among other things, pro-
vided, "Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and inde-
pendence, and the said States hereby severally enter into a firm
league of friendship with each other." These articles were rati-
fied by each Legislature, and not considered binding on a State
until so ratified. They were to be amended by the consent of
the State Legislatures.
These articles gave Congress power to declare war, make
peace, and enter into treaties, but not to levy taxes or imposts;
and it could not act on individuals, nor compel obedience to its
orders. It recommended the States to raise troops, and the
States did, or did not, comply, just as they pleased. Their
refusal or delay greatly retarded the success of the war; and
when the pressure of immediate danger was removed, and peace
concluded, the evil became unbearable. The States enacted hos-
YALE LAW JOURNAL
tile tariffs, refused to be bound by the treaties and laws made by
Congress, refused to raise money for the support of the general
government, or for the payment of interest on the national debt.
Necessity compelled the calling of a convention, and this formed
our Constitution. It was ratified by Conventions in each State,
chosen by the people of that State, and not by the Legislatures.
Its opponents assailed it because it formed, not a league, not a
confederacy, but a consolidated government. And its friends,
learned, acute-the ink scarcely dry on their signatures to the
Constitution-what did they do? Admitted the charge, and
justified themselves and their handiwork by asserting that a con-
solidated government was necessary. Let us quote from the
debates in the Virginia Convention:
Patrick Henry said in his speech against the Constitution,
June 4, 1788:
"I would make this inquiry of those worthy characters
of the late federal convention: I am sure they were
fully impressed with the necessity of forming a great con-
solidated government, and the danger of such a govern-
ment is, to my mind, very striking. I have the highest
veneration for those gentlemen, but, Sir, give me leave
to demand, what right had they to say, 'We, the People'?
My political curiosity, exclusive of my anxious solicitude
for the public welfare, leads me to ask, who authorized
them to speak the language of, 'We, the People', instead
of We, the States? States are the characteristics and
soul of a confederation. If the States be not the agents
of this compact it must be one great consolidated national
government of the people of all the States."
On the 6th of June, Edmund Randolph replied:
"My intention is to satisfy the gentlemen of this com-
mittee that a national government is absolutely indispen-
sable, and that a confederacy is not eligible in our present
situation. The introductory step to this will be to
endeavor to convince the House of the necessity of the
Union, and that the present confederacy is actually inade-
quate and unamendable."
In Mr. Madison's speech in favor of the Constitution he said:
"The distinction between the existing and proposed
government is very material. The existing system has
been derived from the dependent, derivative authority of
THE SUPREME COURT
the Legislatures of the States, whereas this is derived
from the superior power of the people." And again:
"A government that relies on thirteen independent sov-
ereignties for the means of its existence, is a solecism in
theory, and a mere nullity in practice."'
The Constitution itself begins with the declaration:
"We, the People of the United States, in order to form
a more perfect union,* * * do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America."
Under it the General Government acts directly upon indi-
viduals in all cases in which it has power to act at all. This is
the essential distinction between a confederacy and a govern-
ment. The former can only recommend its component States
to act; the latter compels its citizens to obey. The Constitution
authorizes the General Government to make war and peace, coin
money, lay taxes and duties, regulate commerce, define and pun-
ish crimes against it. All these the States are prohibited from
doing.
We have, then, a Union, not a Confederacy; a Government,
not a League. As well might a county refuse to be bound by
any but its own construction of a law of the State, as a State
set up to judge for itself of the constitutionality of a law of the
United States. If one State has the right, all have it. If the
question be one affecting their interests diversely, they will
decide differently; and who will then decide between them?
There can be no arbiter but the sword, revolution or civil war.
Well did Mr. Webster say that "if there be no power to settle
such questions independent of either of the States, the Union
is a rope of sand."
The conclusion of Union men down to the Civil War was
that the Central Government had the right to decide as to the
extent of its powers and this conclusion was permanently ratified
by that War. But the question still remained, In which depart-
ment 6f the Government is the authority vested? The theory
'See 3 Webster's Works, (Little & Brown ed. in 6 Vols.) 484, for a
full collection of the ordinances adopting the Constitution. And see
the Speech of James Wilson in the Pennsylvania Convention, November
26, 1787; and of Alexander Hamilton, in the New York Convention,
June 2o, 1788. See also Steamboat Company v. Livingston, 3 Cowen, 750,
753, et seq.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
that each department must decide for itself originated early in
the last Century. Jackson gave it the authority of his great
name, and his faithful supporter in the Senate, Thomas H. Ben-
ton, maintained that the Supreme Court had not jurisdiction to
decide political questions. This theory is not supported by any
provision of the Constitution. Its advocates aver that our lib-
erties are in danger if the Supreme Court has the right to decide
constitutional questions. Why we may not rely on it as safely
as on the President or Congress we are not told. The principal
object of having an arbiter of constitutional questions is to
secure uniformity of decision. The theory we are examining
does not pretend that a President or Congress is bound by the
decision of its predecessors, in fact it asserts the contrary. Each
must judge for himself or itself. And they will disagree, and
have disagreed. Hence we would be driven to the absurdity of
maintaining that what the Government has power to do under
one administration it cannot do under another, although the
Constitution remains the same. In Washington's administration
the Government had power to establish a Bank; in Jackson's it
had not. Madison could provide for internal improvements;
Van Buren could not. A tariff for protection is constitutional
under Adams; unconstitutional under Polk. Admirable cer-
tainty of the law! Treason under one administration is praise-
worthy opposition to an unconstitutional law under another.
This theory is, however, true to a certain extent. In the first
instance each department of the government must of course
decide as to its own powers. It does so of necessity in exercising
them. And that decision is valid until a case involving it comes
before the Supreme Court; and until then, no one pretends that
that Court has jurisdiction to decide anything.
The origin of the theory is obvious. The ultimate right of
private judgment underlies our whole government. The man
who realizes this says to himself; I am sworn to support the
Constitution. My judgment is thus and so. I must carry out
my own judgment in the matter. And he says it the more per-
emptorily if conscience intervene. Then he becomes stubborn.
"Men will wrangle for religion," says Lacon, "fight for it;
die for it; anything but live for it." But we should remember
that liberty is worse than useless unless directed and restrained
by law. The right of private judgment, like the freedom of the
press, needs regulation. In truth there can be no liberty with-
out obedience to law.
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Nor do we say anything against the right of revolution. Like
war, it can be justified only in a case of extreme danger or
extreme oppression. But these rights of revolution and con-
scientious resistance to unrighteous laws do not exist under the
law, but in opposition to it. We are now, however, discussing
rights which exist under the Constitution and by virtue thereof.
And under the Constitution, and in opposition to both the
theories we have referred to, we assert that the proper and only
arbiter of all constitutional questions is the Supreme Court of
the United States, and that from its decision on a case before it
there can be no appeal; that by such a decision every officer of
the General, State, and Territorial Governments, and every
citizen, is bound.
And, first, what does the Constitution itself say? The Sixth
Article provides:
"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States
which shall be pissed in pursuance thereof, and all
treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
land; and the judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State
to the contrary notwithstanding."
The Third Article provides:
"Section i. The judicial power of the United States
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior
courts, as the Congress may from time to time ordain or
establish.
"Section 2. The judicial power shall extend to all
cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution,
the laws of the United States and treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their authority; to all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies
between two or more States; betveen a State and citizens
of another State; between citizens of the same State
claiming lands under grants of different States; and
between a State or the citizens thereof and foreign States,
citizens, or subjects."
Can words be clearer? The Constitution and laws are
supreme. Nothing, then, can be higher. The judicial power
extends to all cases arising under them, and to all controversies
to which the United States or any State is a party. In such
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cases the Supreme Court has either original or appellate juris-
diction, says the Constitution. Jurisdiction of what? Of the
persons only? No, but of the cases also. Of them as a nullity,
as a form, sounding but empty? No, but a substantial, efficient
jurisdiction, to hear and to decide.
Thus the Supreme Court is made by the Constitution a
co-ordinate branch of the United States Government.
The Confederacy even provided a mode of deciding contro-
versies between the States. It would be strange if the Consti-
tution, in all other respects a stronger and more perfect
government, should in this particular have fallen short of it.
So essential was such a provision deemed that the clauses in
the Constitution which we have quoted excited little criti-
cism. They were fully discussed in Convention and deliberately
adopted.2 They were acquiesced in by the good sense of the
country. We do not find that in the conventions of either New
York or Massachusetts a single word was said on the subject
now under discussion. But in the Federalist the whole Con-
stitution was examined section by section; and the article
relating to the Judiciary was in its turn discussed by Alexander
Hamilton, who "was born to be g-eat. Whoever was second,
Hamilton was first." In this exposition Madison and Jay con-
curred, so that in the following passages from that work we
have the unanimous opinion of these three men, to whom the
country has ever looked as high authority in constitutional
questions.
"If it be said that the legislative body are themselves
the constitutional judges of their own powers, and that
the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon
the other departments, it may be answered that this can-
not be the natural presumption where it is not to be col-
lected from any particular provisions in the Constitution.
'James Madison's letter of October 24, 1787, to Thomas Jefferson,
enclosing copy of constitution, 5 Madison's Works, 22-23, 26-8; 3 Far-
rand's Records of the Federal Convention, 133-135; Madison's Speech
on Amendments to Constitution, June 8, 1789, 5 Madison's Works, 380-I,
385; Madison's letter of December, 1831, to N. P. Trist, 3 Farrand, 516;
Madison's letter of October 21, 1833, to W. C. Rives, quoting Jefferson's
view, 3 Farrand, 522-4; Thomas Jefferson, 5 Jefferson's Works (Ford
ed.), 8o-i; 4 Jefferson's Works, 476-7; 5 Jefferson's Works, 5, 45, 47,
76, 77; Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, No. 78; 9 Hamilton's
Works, Lodge's ed., 484-6.
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It is not otherwise to be supposed that the Constitution
could intend to enable the representatives of the people
to substitute their will for that of their constituents. It
is far more rational to suppose that the courts were
designed to be an intermediate body between the people
and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep
the latter within the limits assigned to their authority."3
And, quoting Montesquieu, he says: "There is no lib-
erty if the power of judging be not separated from the
legislative and executive powers.'
It is obvious, from a careful perusal of Elliott's Debates as
well as from the Federalist, that the delegates to the several
Conventions, and the people generally had studied the history of
other nations. Constant appeal is made to this.
Long before 1789 other nations had tried forms of govern-
ment in which the will of the public officials was supreme and
in which the individual had no protection from arbitrary power.
By the law of the Roman Empire the will of the Prince was
paramount. He had the right by special decree to interpret
statutes in reference to cases pending in the courts.
Sic volo, sic jubeo, stet pro ratione voluntas.
The result was tyranny, not freedom.
The Legislative Assembly in France in the days of the Direc-
tory had unlimited powers. They were constantly depriving
citizens of life, liberty and property without due process of law.
The result was justly called the Reign of Terror, and it resulted
in national ruin and disgrace. At last Napoleon got into the
saddle and at least gave the people security and order. All
experience shows that the honest, hard-working people who are
the real life and strength of a nation will not long submit to be
plundered or oppressed by public officers even though these were
selected by a temporary majority of voters. The real majority
will have security and order at any cost. The American method
embodied in the American Constitution maintains security and
preserves order, and protects the life, liberty and property of the
individual from unlawful restraint or interference.
This American method of limiting the powers of Executive
and Legislative, and entrusting to the Federal Courts the right
Federalist, No. 78, p. 357, Hallowell ed. 1857.
"Ibid., p. 356.
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to decide upon the meaning of the language used in conferring
those powers has been in full force ever since the government
went into operation in 1789.
The Federal Circuit Courts, in 1791 and again in 1795, held
that it was not only the right but the duty of the Court to decide
that an act of the legislature in violation of the Constitution was
void.5 How otherwise could the provision be enforced that the
Constitution was the Supreme Law? If a law is supreme, it
must -control. The only way to make its control effective is to
enforce it. This enforcement is enforcing the authority that
the people, in adopting the Constitution, gave to the Court.
These decisions were in 18o3 followed by the Supreme Court
in Marbury v. Madison.8 In that famous case Chief Justice
Marshall, delivering the opinion of the Court, stated (pp. 176-7)
with his customary clearness the reasons which led the people
to confer this great power upon the courts:
"That the people have an original right to establish,
for their future government, such principles as, in their
opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the
basis on which the whole American fabric has been
erected.
"This original and supreme will organizes the govern-
ment and assigns to different departments their respective
powers. It may either stop here, or establish certain
limits not to be transcended by those departments.
"The government of the United States is of the latter
description. The powers of the legislature are defined
and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken,
or forgotten, the Constitution is written. To what pur-
pose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limi-
tation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any
time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The
distinction between a government with limited and
unlimited powers is abolished if those limits do not con-
fine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts
prohibited and acts allowed are of equal obligation. It is
a proposition too plain to be contested, that the Constitu-
tion controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that
the legislature may alter the Constitution by any ordinary
act.
"Between these alternatives there is no middle ground.
The Constitution is either a superior paramount law
Van Home v. Dorrance, 2 Dallas 304.
'i Cranch 137.
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unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with
ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable
when the legislature shall please to alter it."
the famous debate in 1833 between Webster and Calhoun
upon the right of secession turned upon this very point. Cal-
houn argued that the Constitution was a compact between sov-
ereign States, that there was no common arbiter to decide
disputed questions and that each State must therefore decide for
itself. Webster argued:
"That the Constitution of the United States . . . is
a government proper, founded on the adoption of the
people . . . That there is a supreme law, consisting of
the Constitution of the United States, acts of Congress
passed in pursuance of it, and treaties, . . . and in cases
capable of assuming, and actually assuming the* character
of a suit, the Supreme Court of the United States is the
final interpreter."
It cost this nation thousands of lives and billions of money to
establish and enforce this proposition of Daniel Webster.
Perhaps in our time no one has stated this proposition more
clearly than President Wilson.7
"Our courts are the balance wheel of our whole Consti-
tutional system; and ours is the only constitutional sys-
tem so balanced and controlled. Other constitutional
systems lack complete poise and certainty of operation
because they lack the support and interpretation of
authoritative, indisputable courts of law."'
In pursuance of the authority thus conferred by the Constitu-
tion, the Supreme Court rendered a series of decisions which
really made us a nation. These declared that certain acts of
local legislatures were void, and that the supreme law of the
United States must control.
In McCullough v. Maryland,9 the Court held that the Federal
Government could not be controlled in the exercise of its func-
tions by the taxing power of the State. It also held the charter
'American Constitutional Government, p. 142.
'This was written before the Courts of Canada and the Judicial Com-
mittee of the British Privy Council had begun to follow our example
and pass upon the validity of acts of Canadian Legislatures. Under
the Home Rule Act, passed this year, Acts of the Irish Parliament will
be subject to the authority of the Courts.
94 Wheat. 316 (1819).
22
YALE LAW JOURNAL
of the United States Bank to be a constitutional exercise of the
power of Congress.
In Gibbons v. Ogden,10 it held that commerce between the
States could not be controlled by an act of the State Legislature.
In the Bank of Augusta v. Earle,1 it held that a corporation
incorporated under the laws of one State had a right to do busi-
ness in another.
In the Passenger Tax Cases,12 the Supreme Court held that
State statutes undertaking to regulate and control immigration
into the United States were in violation of the Federal Consti-
tution and that whole subject was a part of foreign commerce
which was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Congress.
In every one of these cases the State Court had decided in
favor of the validity of the obnoxious State statute.
It is not too much to say that if these four leading cases had
been decided otherwise the United States government would
not have been worth preserving, and would have gone to pieces
at the first serious assault. A nation whose agencies can be
taxed out of existence by a part of the nation, which has no
power to provide instrumentalities for interstate and international
commerce, whose citizens have no right to trade or do business
outside of the limits of their own local jurisdiction, and whose
foreign commerce is subject to the control of each particular
part, is no nation at all. The bond of such a country would
indeed be a rope of sand.
It was then essential to our national existence that these sev-
eral statutes which local legislatures had adopted should be
annulled by some superior authority and that the rights which
they assailed should in some way be vindicated.
There are only two ways in which such rights can be secured.
One is peaceable, by an appeal to the courts; the other is forci-
ble, by an appeal to arms. When the subject is seriously con-
sidered, it will appear that restrictions upon the power of the
courts to enforce peaceably the guaranties of the Constitution
will end inevitably in the reign of force. In the kingdom of
force, justice is silent and the strongest prevails.
Just now it is fashionable to criticise the action of courts in
setting aside legislative statutes, and to claim that legislatures
"9 Wheat. I (1824).
n13 Pet. 519 (839).
27 How. 283, 412.
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should be exempt from judicial control. But there have been
many instances in the history of this country when legislatures
have been partisan, oppressive and corrupt. Let us mention
a few.
In the early days of the Republic all franchises were granted
by special act. When the Federalists controlled the New York
Legislature they refused to grant a banking franchise to their
political opponents. The bank of the Manhattan Company is a
perpetual reminder that Burr was obliged to obtain a banking
franchise for his political supporters under cover of a franchise
to supply the city of New York with water.
Similar abuses existed in all the States. Constitutional amend-
ments were therefore adopted which prohibited the formation
of corporations except under general acts.
Again, in many States, the vast power of taxation has been
exerted corruptly or unequally and constitutional amendments
to prevent this abuse have been adopted. To what end is this
unless the Courts can enforce them?
Just after the Civil War an experiment was tried with legis-
latures which in fact had absolute power. The legislatures
which were established under the Federal government in the
states lately in secession were, to all practical purposes, not con-
trolled by the courts, for the judges appointed in those evil days
showed no disposition to limit the power of the local legislatures.
Indeed federal officials were expressly instructed by the War
Department to disregard orders made by the local courts. The
result was a reign of corruption and oppression that proved
intolerable. In 1877 by general consent the Federal troops were
withdrawn from the Southern States and the white people of
those states were permitted to manage their affairs in their own
way. They went back to the old American principle of legisla-
tures with powers limited by written constitutions, and with
courts able and willing to enforce such limitations and vindicate
the rights of the people as against legislative excess. Then for
the first time prosperity came back to the Southern States. Not
only the whites, but the blacks began to accumulate property and
the honest, hard-working man for the first time since the war
was able to reap the reward of his labors.
One recent instance remains to be mentioned. Within two
years the Senate of the United States, acting in conformity to
the general public sentiment of the country, set aside-the election
of Senator Lorimer by the Legislature of Illinois on the ground
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that it was obtained from the Legislature by the corrupt use of
money.
This brief story of legislative corruption and usurpation might
be greatly extended. No one who studied it can seriously urge
that the power of the courts to deal with unconstitutional legis-
lation should be limited.
To quote again from the Federalist:"3
"There ought always to be a constitutional method of
giving efficacy to constitutional provisions. What, for
instance, would avail restrictions on the power of the
State legislatures, without some constitutional mode of
enforcing the observance of them? The States, by the
plan of the convention, are prohibited from doing a
variety of things, some of which are incompatible with
the interests of the Union, others with the principles of
good government. The imposition of duties on imported
articles, and the emission of paper money, are specimens
of each kind. No man of sense will believe that such
prohibitions would be scrupulously regarded without
some effectual power in the government to restrain or
correct the infractions of them. This power must either
be a direct negative on the State laws, or an authority in
the Federal courts to overrule such as might be in mani-
fest contravention of the articles of union. There is no
third course that I can imagine. The latter appears to
No. 8o, p. 364. The state courts from the beginning have held that
the decisions of the Supreme Court were binding upon them in all cases
involving the construction of the United States Constitution. Common-
wealth v. Lewis, 6 Binney (Pa.) 266, 272 (814); Bank of United
States v. Norton, 3 A. K. Marshall (Ky.) 422 (1821). At p. 423, speak-
ing of the United States Supreme Court the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky said: "Whose exposition of the constitution or statutes of the
United States is conclusive on all State Courts throughout the United
States," S. P. Steamboat Co. v. Livingstolt, 3 Cowen (N. Y.) 713, 725,
740, 755 (,825). In 1827 the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors
overruled its own decision in Smith v. Mead, 3 Conn. 253 (I82O), on
the authority of the Supreme Court. Hempshead v. Reed, 6 Conn. 480.
Sherrill v. Hopkins, i Cowen, io3 (1823), on the same authority over-
ruled Penzeman v. Meigs, 9 Johns. 325. Marsh v. Putnam, 3 Gray
(Mass.) 43 (1854), overruled on same authority Braquard v. Marshall,
8 Pick. (Mass.) 194 (1829). Many more recent decisions might be
cited, but these earlier cases have more historic value. On the other
hand, the state courts have frequently refused to follow the decisions
of the Supreme Court on questions of commercial law. N. Y. Firemen
Ins. Co. v. DeWolf, 2 Cowen (N. Y.) 56, 66, 70 (1823); Rice v. Hart,
x18 Mass. 2oi (875).
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have been thought by the convention preferable to the
former, and, I presume, will be most agreeable to the
States."
Upon this construction of the Constitution the Supreme Court
has always acted and its decisions have been enforced. Against
the potent opposition of Andrew Jackson it decided the United
States Bank constitutional; and under that decision the Bank
brought suits in every civilized country, made contracts, issued
notes, and men were imprisoned for forging or stealing those
notes. When the Civil War came a new National banking sys-
tem came into being, and has existed in full force and vigor
ever since. On the sixteenth of November, 1914, the Federal
Reserve Banks went into operation. That system will be of
great public benefit. The authority to create it rests upon the
decision in McCullough v. Maryland.
The Supreme Court decided a tariff for protection constitu-
tional, and the revenue of the country was for many years col-
lected under a protective tariff. The same court decided internal
improvements constitutional. A powerful party assailed this
construction, but it prevailed. Every Congress now passes bills
authorizing such improvements, and when Franklin Pierce
vetoed such a bill, it was passed over his veto-the first instance
of such an occurrence in the history of the country. Massachu-
setts, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Vir-
ginia, West Virginia, Georgia, Illinois, and Missouri have all
appeared in the court-room at Washington before that august
tribunal.
Without it what were our boasted Union? A collection of
jarring States, quarreling the more bitterly because closely
united, and without hope of reconciliation because without a
mediator.
There is a fourth theory which has within the last few years
found advocates. It is that the People are the final arbiters and
that all questions of construction of the constitution must be
decided by them. This dogma has received the somewhat vague
title of the Recall and Referendum. Put into plain English,
what the recall and referendum mean, as applied to constitu-
tional questions, is that the power of a temporary majority over
the lives and property of the individual is absolute and uncon-
trolled. For example, the constitution says that private property
shall not be taken for public use without compensation. A piece
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of land belonging to an individual is desired by a temporary
majority, and they find it inconvenient to pay its value. A judge
decides that the majority has not power to do this. In short,
that while the People is sovereign, it is a limited and not an
autocratic sovereign. Accordingly he grants an injunction for-
bidding the officers from taking the land. Thereupon under the
operation of the Recall he can be driven from office and a sub-
servient judge elected who will decide in favor of the will of
the temporary majority. By the Referendum the question as to
whether or not the honest judge has decided right could be sub-
mitted to popular vote, and if the temporary majority again voted
that he decided wrong, his decision would go for nothing.
When we remember that majorities in a popular government
are fluctuating and that the same party that triumphs in one
election is often defeated in the next, it will at once appear
that to leave questions of individual right to the decision of a
temporary majority would simply be to leave the right of the
individual in the most vague and uncertain condition. The old
maxim is- that such a condition is wretched slavery, misera
servitus. The despotism of an individual is no more to be feared
than the despotism of a temporary majority.
The whole prosperity of the American people has steadily
increased since 1789, at which time, as has been shown, it was
determined that the popular government of the United States
should be indeed a government of the People, but that the Peo-
ple had chosen deliberately to impose upon the power of officials
temporarily in office certain limits for the protection of the
rights of the individual. It is by this union of the sacredness
of individual rights with the authority of law within its own
sphere, that we obtain security for the individual rights. With-
out security there can be no prosperity.
In conclusion let us ask: In whose hands could the power
of deciding as to the extent of the powers which the People
have chosen to confer upon their agents, better be placed than
in the Justices of the Supreme Court? Appointed during good
behavior, and therefore independent, with fixed salaries, decid-
ing questions of international, constitutional and municipal law,
chosen from the first men of the bar of forty-eight states, what
method could have been devised which would better secure
purity, impartiality, and learning? We dare challenge a com-
parison with the courts of every, nation in the world. From
its first Chief Justice, the Hale of America, John Jay, a learned
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lawyer, a wise statesman, a large-hearted Christian man, whom
New York honors as one of her noblest sons, through a long
line of illustrious names, Marshall, Story, Bushrod, Washing-
ton, Brockholst, Livingston, Chase, Brown, Blatchford,-what
court that ever sat can show such a roll? "Si antiquitatem
spectes, est vetustissima; si honorem, est honoratissima; si
jurisdictionem, est capacissima."
Well might Edward Everett say of it in 1855: "I do not know
what others may think on the subject, but for myself, Sir, I will
say that, if all the labors, the sacrifices, and the waste of treasure
and blood, from the first landing at Jamestown or Plymouth,
were to give us nothing else but the Supreme Court of the United
States, this revered tribunal for the settlement of international
disputes (for such it may be called), I should say the sacrifice
was well made. I have trodden with emotion the threshold of
Westminster Hall, and of the Palace of Justice in France; I
thought with respect of a long line of illustrious chancellors
and judges, surrounded with the insignia of office, clothed in
scarlet and ermine, who within these ancient halls have, without
fear or favor, administered justice between powerful litigants.
But it is with deeper emotions of reverence, it is with something
like awe, "that I have entered the Supreme Court at Washington.
Not that I have there heard strains of forensic eloquence rarely
equalled, never surpassed, from the Wirts, the Pinkneys, and the
Websters; but because I have seen there a bright display of the
perfection of the moral sublime in human affairs. I have wit-
nessed how, from the dark, low bench, destitute of the emblems
of power, from the lips of some grave and venerable magistrate,
to whom years and gray hairs could add no new titles to respect
(I need write no name under that portrait), the voice of justice
and equity has gone forth to the most powerful States of the
Union, administering the law between citizens of Independent
States, settling dangerous controversies, adjusting disputed
boundaries, annulling unconstitutional laws, reversing erroneous
decisions, and, with a few mild words of judicial wisdom, dis-
posing of questions a hundredfold more important than those
which, without the past year, from the plains of Holstein, have
shaken the pillars of Continental Europe, and all but brought a
million of men into deadly conflict with each other."'"
EVEETT P. WHEELER.
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